# B(IUE)Sides

Experiences from four years in the trenches that will change the way you think about your detection capability

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Cybersecurity consultant @ PwC BSides Cyprus - October 2019

### About me

- Cybersecurity consultant @PwC
- Three years @BankOfEngland SOC
- Intelligence Driven ID&R proponent
- I think a lot about models and methods

### About this talk

Misperceptions and insights (tech and beyond) on building a (truly) effective detection capability

## What am I presenting?

Not the #HolyGrailOfDetection but rather my personal experience and views on building an effective detection capability

# On pretty good detection capability - that isn't

# For the past year, I've been asking my clients...

### "How do you detect attacks against your assets?"

# "We have contracted an MSSP to monitor our network..."

- but have no idea what they are doing



### "We have invested in best of breed security products..."

- but are not absolutely sure why
- we have some idea what they are doing



## "We are collecting all logs in a SIEM..."

- still not sure what to do with those (i.e. nobody really monitors because it's a mess)



### "We are doing regular pentests and red team exercises..."

- and they find critical findings <u>every time</u> so...

## (Heart)breaking news

#### - It ain't gonna work!

#ButYouAlreadyKnew





"We have contracted an MSSP to monitor our network...." #1



# You know your organisation better than any MSSP ever will

...if you don't, how are you sure your MSSP is doing a good job?



"We have invested in best of breed security products..."



Even the best products cannot detect all attacks.

No tool can substitute a capable analyst.





# Collecting the logs is not enough.

# Collecting *all* the logs is a very bad idea.




"We are doing regular pentests and red team exercises..."



#### Pentests and Red Teams are not designed to substitute your blue team.


Just saying...

### 404 Detection Capability Not Found!



# **On pretty** good detection - that actually is!

"You don't reach the mountaintop from the mountaintop. You start from the bottom and climb up".



Know WHAT you are defending before you try defending it!

#### "Every battle is won before it is fought"



### The ATT&CK Matrix

#### Attacker Tactics

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command And Control	Exfiltration	Impact
11 items	33 items	59 items	28 items	67 items	19 items	22 items	17 items	13 items	22 items	9 items	14 items
Drive-by Compromise	AppleScript	.bash_profile and .bashrc	Access Token Manipulation	Access Token Manipulation	Account Manipulation	Account Discovery	AppleScript	Audio Capture	Commonly Used Port	Automated Exfiltration	Data Destruction
Exploit Public-Facing	CMSTP	Accessibility Features	Accessibility Features	Binary Padding	Bash History	Application Window Discovery	Application Deployment	Automated Collection	Communication Through	Data Compressed	Data Encrypted for Impact
Application	Command-Line Interface	Account Manipulation	AppCert DLLs	BITS Jobs	Brute Force	Browser Bookmark Discovery	Software	Clipboard Data	Removable Media	Data Encrypted	Defacement
External Remote Services	Compiled HTML File	AppCert DLLs	Appinit DLLs	Bypass User Account Control	Credential Dumping	Domain Trust Discovery	Distributed Component Object Model	t Data from Information	Connection Proxy	Data Transfer Size Limits	Disk Content Wipe
Hardware Additions	Control Panel Items	Appinit DLLs	Application Shimming	Clear Command History	Credentials in Files	File and Directory Discovery	Exploitation of Remote	Repositories	Custom Command and Control Protocol	Exfiltration Over Alternative	Disk Structure Wipe
Replication Through Removable Media	e Dynamic Data Exchange	Application Shimming	Bypass User Account Control	CMSTP	Credentials in Registry	Network Service Scanning	Services	Data from Local System	Custom Cryptographic Protocol	Protocol	Endpoint Denial of Service
Spearphishing Attachment	Execution through API	Authentication Package	DLL Search Order Hijacking	Code Signing	Exploitation for Credential	Network Share Discovery	Logon Scripts	Data from Network Shared Drive	Data Encoding	Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel	Firmware Corruption
Spearphishing Link	Execution through Module Load	BITS Jobs	Dylib Hijacking	Compile After Delivery	Access	Network Sniffing	Pass the Hash	Data from Removable Media	-	Exfiltration Over Other	Inhibit System Recovery
Spearphishing via Service	Exploitation for Client Execution	Bootkit	Exploitation for Privilege	Compiled HTML File	Forced Authentication	Password Policy Discovery	Pass the Ticket	Data Staged	Domain Fronting	Network Medium	Network Denial of Service
Supply Chain Compromise	Graphical User Interface	Browser Extensions	Escalation	Component Firmware	Hooking	Peripheral Device Discovery	Remote Desktop Protocol	Email Collection	Domain Generation Algorithms	Exfiltration Over Physical	Resource Hijacking
Trusted Relationship	InstallUtil	Change Default File Association	Extra Window Memory Injection	Component Object Model Hijacking	Input Capture	Permission Groups Discovery	Remote File Copy	Input Capture	Fallback Channels	Medium	Runtime Data Manipulation
Valid Accounts	Launchetl	Component Firmware	File System Permissions	Control Panel Items	Input Prompt	Process Discovery	Remote Services	Man in the Browser	Multi-hop Proxy	Scheduled Transfer	Service Stop
	Local Job Scheduling	Component Object Model	Weakness	DCShadow	Kerberoasting	Query Registry	Replication Through	Screen Capture	Multi-Stage Channels		Stored Data Manipulation
	LSASS Driver	Hijacking	Hooking	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or	Keychain	Remote System Discovery	Removable Media	Video Capture	Multiband Communication		Transmitted Data Manipulation
	Mshta	Create Account	Image File Execution Options	Information	LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and Relay	Security Software Discovery	Shared Webroot		Multilayer Encryption		
	PowerShell	DLL Search Order Hijacking	Injection	Disabling Security Tools	Network Sniffing Password Filter DLL	System Information Discovery System Network Configuration	SSH Hijacking Taint Shared Content		Port Knocking		
	Regsvcs/Regasm	Dylib Hijacking	Launch Daemon	DLL Search Order Hijacking					Remote Access Tools		
	Regsvr32	External Remote Services	New Service	DLL Side-Loading	Private Keys	Discovery	Third-party Software		Remote File Copy		
	Rundll32	File System Permissions	Path Interception	Execution Guardrails	-	System Network Connections Discovery	Windows Admin Shares		Standard Application Layer		
	Scheduled Task	Weakness Hidden Files and Directories	Plist Modification	Exploit tion for Defense Evasion	Securityd Memory	System Owner/User Discovery	Windows Remote Management		Protocol		
	Scripting		Port Monitors	Extra Willdow Memory Injection	Two-Factor Authentication Interception	System Service Discovery	Management		Standard Cryptographic Protocol		
	Service Execution	Hooking	Process Injection	File Deletion		System Time Discovery			Standard Non-Application Layer		
	Signed Binary Proxy Execution	Hypervisor	Scheduled Task	File Permissions Modification		Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion			Protocol		
	Signed Script Proxy Execution	Image File Execution Options Injection	Service Registry Permissions	File System Log cal Offsets					Uncommonly Used Port		
	Source	Kernel Modules and Extensions	Weakness	Gatekeeper Bypass	Λ 11		<del> </del> -		Web Service		
	Space after Filename	Launch Agent	Setuid and Setgid	Group Policy Modification		acker Te	ecnnio	lues			
	Third-party Software	Launch Daemon	SID-History Injection	Hidden Files and Directories							
	Тгар	Launchctl	Startup Items	Hidden Users							
	Trusted Developer Utilities	LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition	Sudo	Hidden Window							
	User Execution	Local Job Scheduling	Sudo Caching Valid Accounts	HISTCONTROL							

#### Anyone said...knowledge base of attacker TTPs?

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👖 Apps 🛛 📕 Managed bookmarks 📕 C	yber EMEA Calend.	📙 NIS Directive 📙 Ir	ncident Detection 📙 Incident Response 📙 PwC finance 2/2 🔨 🗸 🗸 🗙 19 📙 General IT » 📑 Other bookman									
MITRE ATT&CK			Matrices Tactics ▼ Techniques ▼ Mitigations ▼ <u>Groups</u> Software Resources ▼ Blog									
APT37		Group, Comment Panda	its Military Unit Cover Designator (MUCD) as Unit 61398.									
APT38	APT12	IXESHE, DynCalc,	APT12 is a threat group that has been attributed to China. The group has targeted a variety of victims including but not limited to media outlets, high-tech companies, and multiple									
APT39	AFTIZ	Numbered Panda,	governments.									
Axiom		DNSCALC										
BlackOasis	APT16 APT16 is a China-based threat group that has launched spearphishing campaigns targeting Japanese and Taiwanese organizations.											
BRONZE BUTLER	10717											
Carbanak	APT17 Deputy Dog APT17 is a China-based threat group that has conducted network intrusions against U.S. government entities, the defense industry, law firms, information technology companies, mining companies, and non-government organizations.											
Charming Kitten												
Cleaver	APT18	TG-0416, Dynamite Panda,	APT18 is a threat group that has operated since at least 2009 and has targeted a range of industries, including technology, manufacturing, human rights groups, government, and medical.									
Cobalt Group		Threat Group-0416										
CopyKittens	APT19	Codoso, C0d0so0, Codoso Team, Sunshop Group	APT19 is a Chinese-based threat group that has targeted a variety of industries, including defense, finance, energy, pharmaceutical, telecommunications, high tech, education, manufacturing, and legal services. In 2017, a phishing campaign was used to target seven law and investment firms. Some analysts track APT19 and Deep Panda as the same group, but									
Dark Caracal			it is unclear from open source information if the groups are the same.									
Darkhotel												
DarkHydrus	APT28	SNAKEMACKEREL, Swallowtail, Group 74,	APT28 is a threat group that has been attributed to Russia's Main willigence Directorate of the Russian General Staff by a July 2018 U.S. Department of Justice indictment. This group reportedly compromised the Hillary Clinton campaign, the Democratic National Committee, and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee in 2016 in an attempt to interfere									
Deep Panda		Sednit, Sofacy, Pawn Storm,	with the U.S. presidential election. APT28 has been active since at least 2004.									
Dragonfly		Fancy Bear, STRONTIUM, Tsar Team, Threat Group-										
Dragonfly 2.0		4127, TG-4127										
DragonOK	APT29	YTTRIUM, The Dukes, Cozy	APT29 is threat group that has been attributed to the Russian government and has operated since at least 2008. This group reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee									
Dust Storm		Bear, CozyDuke	stealing in the summer of 2015.									
Elderwood	APT3	Gothic Panda, Pirpi, UPS	APT3 is a China-based threat group that researchers have attributed to China's Ministry of State Security. This group is responsible for the campaigns known as Operation Clandestine Fox,									
Equation		Teape, Buckeye, Threat	Operation Clandestine Wolf, and Operation Double Tap. As of June 2015, the group appears to have shifted from targeting primarily US victims to primarily political organizations in Hong									
FIN10		Group-0110, TG-0110	Kong.									
			MITRE has also developed an APT3 Adversary Emulation Plan.									

#### WHO would target your assets?

# "Knowing yourself is the beginning of all wisdom"

#### What do you see?

- Data sources their quality and the visibility they give you

#### AppInit DLLs

Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppInit\_DLLs value in the Registry keys HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows OF HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows are loaded by user32.dll into every process that loads user32.dll. In practice this is nearly every program, since user32.dll is a very common library. <sup>[1]</sup> Similar to Process Injection, these values can be abused to obtain persistence and privilege escalation by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. <sup>[2]</sup>

The AppInit DLL functionality is disabled in Windows 8 and later versions when secure boot is enabled. [3]

#### ID: T1103

Tactic: Persistence, Privilege Escalation

Platform: Windows

System Requirements: Secure boot disabled on systems running Windows 8 and later

Permissions Required: Administrator

Effective Permissions: Administrator, SYSTEM

Data Sources: Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring, Windows Registry

Version: 1.0

#### MITRE ATT&CK<sup>™</sup> Navigator

100% of data sources availa ×

# Understanding your visibility

Check it Out: ATT&CK Navigator https://mitre-attack.github.io/attacknavigator/enterprise/

itial Access			Privilege Escalation		Credential Access		Discovery		Collection		Exfiltration	Impact
l items			21 items	57 items	16 items	_	22 items	15 items	13 items		9 items	14 items
ive-by Compromise			Access Token Manipulation	Access Token Manipulation	Account Manipulatio		Account Discovery	Application Deployment Software	Audio Capture	Commonly Used Port		tion Data Destruction
ploit Public-Facing	Command-Line Interface Compiled HTML File	Account Manipulation	Accessibility Features	Binary Padding BITS Jobs	Brute Force Credential Dumping	_	Application Window Discovery Browser Bookmark Discovery	Distributed	Automated Collection Clipboard Data	Communication Through Removable Media	Data Compressed	Data Encrypted for Impact
ternal Remote	Compiled HTML File Control Panel Items	AppCert DLLs AppInit DLLs	AppCert DLLs		Credential Dumping Credentials in Metac	3		Component Object Model		Connection Proxy	Data Encrypted Data Transfer Size	Defacement
ervices		Application Shimming	AppInit DLLs	CMSTP	Credentials in Metao	data: ilable di	Domain Trust Discovery	Exploitation of Remote	Repositories		Limits	Disk Content Wipe
ardware Additions		Authentication Package	Application Shimming	Code Signing	Exploitation for Powe	ess mor erShell I	Initoring,	Services	Data from Local	Control Protocol	Exfiltration Over	Disk Structure Wipe
eplication Through emovable Media	Execution through Module	DITO Labo	Bypass User Account	Compile After Delivery	Credential Accession	&CK da	Ata sources: API Process Share Discovery	Logon Scripts	System	Custom Cryptographic Protocol	Alternative Protoco	Endpoint Denial of
pearphishing	Load		Control DLL Search Order	Compiled HTML File	Forced Authentimoni	itoring, I	PowerShell ss command-line	Pass the Hash	Data from Network Shared Drive	Data Encoding	Exfiltration Over Command and Con	Service Firmware Corruption
ttachment	Exploitation for Client Execution	Browser Extensions	Hijacking	Component Firmware	Hooking para	meters ducts: V	Windows eventry Discovery	Pass the Ticket		Data Obfuscation	Channel	Inhibit Contant
pearphishing Link	Graphical User Interface	Change Default File	Exploitation for	Component Object Model	Input Capture log	P	Peripheral Device Discovery	Remote Desktop Protocol	Media	Domain Fronting	Exfiltration Over Of Network Medium	Recovery
pearphishing via ervice	InctallIIItil		Privilege Escalation	Hijacking	Input Prompt	P	Permission Groups Discovery	Remote File Copy	Data Staged Email Collection	Domain Generation	Exfiltration Over	Network Denial of Service
upply Chain	LSASS Driver		Extra Window Memory Injection		Kerberoasting	P	Process Discovery	Remote Services			Physical Medium	
ompromise		Component Object Model Hijacking	File System	DCShadow	LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and Relay	Q	Query Registry	Replication Through	Input Capture Man in the Browser	Fallback Channels Multi-hop Proxy	Scheduled Transfe	Resource Hijacking
rusted Relationship	PowerShell	Create Account	Permissions Weakness	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	Network Sniffing	R	Remote System Discovery	Removable Media	Screen Capture	Multi-Stage Channels		Manipulation
alid Accounts		DLL Search Order	Hooking	Disabling Security Tools	Password Filter DLL	-	Security Software Discovery	Shared Webroot Taint Shared Content	Video Capture	Multiband		Service Stop
	Regsvr32	Hijacking	Image File Execution	DLL Search Order Hijacking	Private Keys	_	System Information Discovery	Taint Shared Content Third-party Software		Communication		Stored Data Manipulation
	Rundll32	External Remote Services	Options Injection	DLL Side-Loading	Two-Factor Authentication		System Network Configuration Discovery	Windows Admin		Multilayer Encryption		Manipulation Transmitted Data
	Scheduled Task	File System Permissions Weakness	New Service	Execution Guardrails	Authentication Interception		System Network Connections	Shares		Remote Access Tools		Manipulation
		Hidden Files and	Path Interception	Exploitation for Defense Evasion		D	Discovery	Windows Remote		Remote File Copy		
	and the second second second second second	Directories	Port Monitors Process Injection	Extra Window Memory Injection			System Owner/User Discovery	Management		Standard Application Layer Protocol		
	English Billing ( 10kg		Scheduled Task	File Deletion		_	System Service Discovery			Standard Cryptographic		
	Signed Script Proxy	Hypervisor Image File Execution	Service Registry	File Permissions Modification		_	System Time Discovery			Protocol		
	Execution	Options Injection	Permissions	File System Logical Offsets Group Policy Modification		V	/irtualization/Sandbox Evasion			Standard Non- Application Layer		
	Third-party Software	Logon Scripts	Weakness SID-History Injection	Hidden Files and Directories						Protocol		
	Trusted Developer Utilities	LSASS Driver	Valid Accounts	Hidden Files and Directories						Uncommonly Used Port		
		Modify Existing Service	Web Shell	Injection						Web Service		
	Instrumentation	Netsh Helper DLL		Indicator Blocking								
	Windows Remote	New Service		Indicator Removal from Tools								
		Office Application Startup		Indicator Removal on Host								
	XSL Script Processing	Path Interception		Indirect Command Execution								
		Port Monitors		Install Root Certificate								
		Redundant Access		InstallUtil								
		Registry Run Keys /		Masquerading								
		Startup Folder		Modify Registry								
		Scheduled Task		Mshta Network Share Connection								
		Screensaver		Removal								
		Security Support Provider		NTFS File Attributes								
		Service Registry		Obfuscated Files or Information								
		Permissions Weakness Shortcut Modification		Process Doppelgänging								
		Shortcut Modification SIP and Trust Provider		Process Hollowing								
		Hijacking		Process Injection								
		System Firmware		Redundant Access								
		Time Providers		Regsvcs/Regasm Regsvr32								
		Valid Accounts		Regsvr32								
		Web Shell		Rundli32								
		Windows Management Instrumentation Event		Scripting								
		Subscription		Signed Binary Proxy Execution								
		Winlogon Helper DLL		Signed Script Proxy Execution								
				SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking								
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				Template Injection							•	legenu
				Timestomp							#E1BEE7 1-	25% of data sources avail
				Trusted Developer Utilities							#CE93D8 26	-50% of data sources ava
				Valid Accounts							#CE93D8 26	-ou% of data sources ava
				Minterelling the strendthese Council on								
				Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion							#AB47BC 51	-75% of data sources ava
				Web Service XSL Script Processing								-75% of data sources av

# "A petabyte of data is a terrible thing to waste"

#### **Developing Detection Analytics**

- 1. Something you read
- 2. Something you tried
- 3. Something you know



CALDERA

METTA

#### Understanding your detection coverage

Detection coverage is bias prone! -no, you have not covered everything

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command And Control	Exfiltration	Impa
11 items	27 items	42 items	21 items	57 items	16 items	22 items	15 items	13 items	21 items	9 items	14 ite
Drive-by Compromise	CMSTP	Accessibility Features	Access Token	Access Token Manipulation	Account Manipulation	Account Discovery	Application	Audio Capture	Commonly Used Port	Automated Exfiltration	n Data
Exploit Public-Facing	Command-Line Interface	Account Manipulation	Manipulation	Binary Padding	Brute Force	Application Window Discovery	Deployment Software Distributed	Automated Collection		Data Compressed	Data
Application External Remote	Compiled HTML File	AppCert DLLs	Accessibility Features AppCert DLLs	BITS Jobs	Credential Dumping	Browser Bookmark Discovery	Component Object	Clipboard Data	Removable Media Connection Proxy	Data Encrypted	Defac
Services	Control Panel Items	AppInit DLLs	AppCert DLLs	Bypass User Account Control	Credentials in Files T100 Scor	<sup>3</sup> Domain Trust Discovery	Model	Data from Information Repositories	Connection Proxy Custom Command and	Data Transfer Size Limits	Derad Disk (
Hardware Additions	Dynamic Data Exchange	Application Shimming	Application Shimming	CMSTP		data: and Directory Discovery plicable to: all	Exploitation of Remote Services	Data from Local	Control Protocol	Exfiltration Over	Disk
Replication Through	Execution through API	Authentication Package	Bypass User Account	Code Signing	Exploitation for -De Credential Access -De	tection score::3vice Scanning tection location: EDR	Logon Scripts	System	Custom Cryptographic Protocol	Alternative Protocol	Endp
Removable Media Spearphishing	Execution through Module Load		Control	Compile After Delivery	-Teo Forced Authenticatic:De	chnique comment: -D scovery tection comment:	Pass the Hash	Data from Network Shared Drive	Data Encoding	Exfiltration Over Command and Contro	Servi
Attachment	Exploitation for Client	Bootkit Browser Extensions	DLL Search Order Hijacking	Compiled HTML File Component Firmware	Hooking	Password Policy Discovery	Pass the Ticket	Data from Removable	-	Channel	Firmv
Spearphishing Link	Execution	Change Default File	Exploitation for	Component Object Model	Input Capture	Peripheral Device Discovery	Remote Desktop Protocol	Media	Domain Fronting	Exfiltration Over Othe Network Medium	er Inhibi Reco
Spearphishing via Service	Graphical User Interface InstallUtil	Association	Privilege Escalation	Hijacking	Input Prompt	Permission Groups Discovery	Remote File Copy	Data Staged	Domain Generation	Exfiltration Over	Netw
Supply Chain	LSASS Driver	Component Firmware	Extra Window Memory Injection	Control Panel Items	Kerberoasting	Process Discovery	Remote Services	Email Collection	Algorithms	Physical Medium	Servi
Compromise	Mshta	Component Object Model Hijacking	File System	DCShadow	LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and Relay	Query Registry	Replication Through	Input Capture	Fallback Channels	Scheduled Transfer	Reso
Trusted Relationship	PowerShell	Create Account	Permissions Weakness	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	Network Sniffing	Remote System Discovery	Removable Media	Man in the Browser	Multi-hop Proxy		Runti Manij
Valid Accounts	Regsvcs/Regasm	DLL Search Order	Hooking	Disabling Security Tools	Password Filter DLL	Security Software Discovery	Shared Webroot	Screen Capture	Multi-Stage Channels Multiband		Servi
	Regsvr32	Hijacking	Image File Execution	DLL Search Order Hijacking	Private Keys	System Information Discovery	Taint Shared Content	Video Capture	Communication		Store
	Rundli32	External Remote Services	Options Injection	DLL Side-Loading	Two-Factor	System Network Configuration Discovery	Third-party Software		Multilayer Encryption	_	Manip
	Scheduled Task	File System Permissions Weakness		Execution Guardrails	Authentication Interception	System Network Connections	Windows Admin Shares		Remote Access Tools		Trans Manis
	Scripting	Hidden Files and	Path Interception	Exploitation for Defense Evasion		Discovery	Windows Remote	-	Remote File Copy		
	Service Execution	Directories	Port Monitors	Extra Window Memory Injection		System Owner/User Discovery	Management		Standard Application Layer Protocol		
	Signed Binary Proxy Execution	Hooking	Process Injection	File Deletion		System Service Discovery			Standard Cryptographic		
	Signed Script Proxy	Hypervisor	Scheduled Task	File Permissions Modification		System Time Discovery			Protocol		
	Execution	Image File Execution Options Injection	Service Registry Permissions	File System Logical Offsets		Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion			Standard Non- Application Layer		
	Third-party Software	Logon Scripts	Weakness SID-History Injection	Group Policy Modification Hidden Files and Directories					Protocol		
	Trusted Developer Utilities	LSASS Driver	Valid Accounts	Image File Execution Options					Uncommonly Used Port		
	User Execution	Modify Existing Service	Web Shell	Injection					Web Service		
	Windows Management Instrumentation	Netsh Helper DLL	Heb onen	Indicator Blocking							
	Windows Remote	New Service		Indicator Removal from Tools							
	Management	Office Application Startup		Indicator Removal on Host							
	XSL Script Processing	Path Interception		Indirect Command Execution							
		Port Monitors		Install Root Certificate							
		Redundant Access		InstallUtil							
		Registry Run Keys /		Masquerading Modify Registry							
		Startup Folder Scheduled Task		Mshta							
		Screensaver		Network Share Connection							
		Security Support		Removal							
		Provider		NTFS File Attributes							
		Service Registry Permissions Weakness		Obfuscated Files or Information							
		Shortcut Modification		Process Doppelgänging Process Hollowing							
		SIP and Trust Provider		Process Hollowing Process Injection							
		Hijacking		Redundant Access							
		System Firmware		Regsvcs/Regasm							
		Time Providers Valid Accounts		Regsvr32							
		Valid Accounts Web Shell		Rootkit							
		Windows Management		Rundll32							
		Instrumentation Event		Scripting							
		Subscription Winlogon Helper DLL		Signed Binary Proxy Execution							
				Signed Script Proxy Execution							10.77
				SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking						~	legen
				Software Packing						#64B5F6 Deter	ction sci
				Template Injection Timestomp						#D05000	otion -
				Trusted Developer Utilities						#DCEDC8 Deter	ction sci
				Valid Accounts						#AED581 Deter	ction sci
				Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion							
				Web Service						#8BC34A Deter	ction sco

MITRE ATT&CK<sup>™</sup> Navigator

#### "One Team, Two Team, Red Team, Blue Team!"

Building confidence in your detection capability -a.k.a. how to know it's working

Four approaches:

- 1. Test it yourself (but Bias!)
- 2. Test it with someone else (think Purple Team)
- 3. Have someone put it to the test (think Red Team)
- 4. Wait for someone to put it to the test (ATTAAACK!)

# Use that to identify the gaps...

Tip: Maps of your detection capability can be overlaid with maps of what the Red Team has tried, or what your top adversaries are usually doing to uncover your detection gaps!

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command And Control	Exfiltration	Impact	Τ
11 items	27 items	42 items	21 items	57 items	16 items	22 items	15 items	13 items	21 items	9 items	14 items	_
	Control Panel Items	Security Support	Access Token	Access Token Manipulation	Input Capture	Password Policy Discovery	Logon Scripts	Input Capture	Domain Fronting	Data	Endpoint Denial	
	Service Execution	Provider	Manipulation	Control Panel Items	<b>Credential Dumping</b>	Remote System Discovery	Pass the Hash	Data from	Uncommonly Used	Compressed	of Service	
Drive-by Compromise	PowerShell	AppCert DLLs	Extra Window Memory Injection	Extra Window Memory	Credentials in	System Information	Application	Network Shared Drive	Port	Data Encrypted	Network Denial of Service	
Spearphishing	Regsvr32	Logon Scripts	Process Injection	Injection	Registry	Discovery	Deployment Software	Email Collection	Remote Access Tools	Exfiltration Over Command and	Data Encrypted	i I
Attachment	Rundll32	Image File Execution Options Injection	AppCert DLLs	Masquerading	LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and	System Owner/User Discovery	Distributed	Audio Capture	Commonly Used	Control Channel	for Impact	
Exploit Public-	Scripting	Application	Image File	Process Injection	Relay	Account Discovery	Component Object Model	Automated	Port	Automated Exfiltration	Data Destruction	
Facing Application	Scheduled Task	Shimming	Execution	Regsvr32	Account	Process Discovery	,	Collection	Data Obfuscation	Data Transfer	Defacement	
External Remote Services	User Execution	Scheduled Task	Options Injection	Rundli32	Manipulation	System Network	Exploitation of Remote Services	Clipboard Data	Standard	Size Limits	Disk Content	
Hardware Additions	CMSTP	Accessibility	Application Shimming	Scripting	Brute Force	Configuration Discovery	Pass the Ticket	Data from	Application Layer Protocol	Exfiltration Over	Wipe Diek Structure	
	Command-Line	Features	Scheduled Task	Image File Execution Options Injection	Credentials in Files	Application Window	Remote Desktop	Information Repositories	Communication	Alternative Protocol	Disk Structure Wipe	
Through Removable Media	Interface	Account Manipulation	Accessibility	Timestomp	Exploitation for Credential Access	Discovery	Protocol	Data from Local	Through Removable Media	Exfiltration Over	Firmware	
Spearphishing Link	Compiled HTML File	AppInit DLLs	Features	Obfuscated Files or	Forced	Browser Bookmark Discovery	Remote File Copy	System	Connection Proxy	Other Network	Corruption	
-   · · ·	Dynamic Data Exchange	Authentication	AppInit DLLs	Information	Authentication	Domain Trust Discovery	Remote Services	Data from Pernovable Media	Custom Command	Medium	Inhibit System Recovery	
Service	Execution through API	Package	Bypass User Account Control	Binary Padding	Hooking	File and Directory	Replication Through	Data Staged	and Control Protoco	Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	Resource	
Trusted	Execution through Arr	BITS Jobs	DLL Search Order	BITS Jobs	Input Prompt	Discovery	Removable Media	Man in the	Custom	Scheduled	Hijacking	
Relationship	Module Load	Bootkit	Hijacking	Bypass User Account	Kerberoasting	Network Service Scanning	Shared Webroot	Browser	Cryptographic Protocol	Transfer	Runtime Data	
	Exploitation for Client	Browser Extensions	Exploitation for	Control	Network Sniffing	Network Share Discovery	Taint Shared	Screen Capture	Data Encoding		Manipulation	
	Execution	Change Default File Association	Privilege Escalation	CMSTP	Password Filter DLL	Network Sniffing	Content	Video Capture	Domain Generation		Service Stop	
	Graphical User Interface		File System	Code Signing	Private Keys	Peripheral Device	Third-party Software		Algorithms		Stored Data Manipulation	
	InstallUtil	Component Firmware	Permissions	Compile After Delivery	Two-Factor	Discovery Permission Groups	Windows Admin Shares		Fallback Char 🗸	leo	gend	
	LSASS Driver	Component Object	Weakness	Compiled HTML File	Authentication Interception	Discovery			Multi-hop Pro	,		
	Mshta	Model Hijacking	Hooking	Component Firmware		Query Registry	Windows Remote		Multi-Stage #ffce	ce Tech. not	often used	ζ
	Regsvcs/Regasm	Create Account	New Service	Component Object Model Hijacking		Security Software	Management		Channels			,
	Signed Binary Proxy	DLL Search Order Hijacking	Path Interception	DCShadow		Discovery			Multiband Communicatio	00 Tech. use	d frequently X	6
	Execution	External Remote	Port Monitors Service Registry Permissions	Deobfuscate/Decode Files		System Network Connections Discovery			Multilayer #f9a8	Tech in a	roup + detection ×	/
		Camilana		or Information		System Service Discovery	2		Encryption	iech. In g	roup + detection	
	Execution	File System	Weakness	Disabling Security Tools		System Time Discovery			Remote File C #8BC	34A Tech. in d	etection ×	<
		Permissions Weakness	SID-History Injection	DLL Search Order Hijacking		Virtualization/Sandbox			Standard			
	Trusted Developer Utilities	Hidden Files and		DLL Side-Loading		Evasion			Cryptographic Protocol	Add Item	Clear	
	Windows	Directories	Valid Accounts Web Shell	Execution Guardrails					Standard Non			
	Management	Hooking	web Shell	Exploitation for Defense					Application La			

#### TL;DR If you want to detect attacks against your assets...

#### 1. Prepare to get your hands dirty

- MSSPs, Products, SIEMS and Pentests cannot do the trick if you don't.

#### 2. Adopt a structured approach

- Two models to get you started: The Incident Response Hierarchy of Needs and ATT&CK

#### 3. Visualise, visualise, visualise

- To know where you are at, where you are going to and track your progress.



### Go Explore!

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